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Abstract. Artificial intelligent (AI) systems making autonomous decisions are
present in many areas of our everyday lives. Ideally, and in order to facilitate the
integration of these systems into our society, citizens should avoid thinking neither
that AI resembles those rogue systems often found in fictional works, nor that it has
an intrinsic understanding of human well-being, as both cases would draw a biased
picture of what AI actually is. This position paper argues, through some examples,
how the terminology used in certain articles aimed for the general public often de-
pict AI as one of those two aforementioned images, which attribute intentions and
moral values that those systems do not have and which could, in turn, have a detri-
mental effect on the way the general public understand (and are willing to accept)
those systems into our everyday lives.
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1. Introduction and Motivations
As artificial intelligent (AI) systems become more autonomous, the scenarios in which
they have to make morally-relevant decisions grow. Typical examples include military
robots, self-driving cars, or robots for elderly care [6], to mention a few. The field of
artificial morality studies whether and how AI systems can be furnished with the ability
to identify morally-relevant situations and act accordingly.
Central to this topic is the debate on how to define the concepts of moral agent and
moral patient and, furthermore, how to determine whether AI systems can be included
in any of such groups (see [5] and [3], for example). Although, as pointed out in [5],
technological tools are still often seen under an instrumentalist approach which does not
usually take agency into consideration, works such as [3] or [6] define a different set of
criteria that allows to understand agency at a functional level, and which do not require
the agent to engage in genuine moral reflection, but only to act as if it did. Neverthe-
less, the question of moral agency in AI often takes into account issues concerning con-
sciousness or intentions, among others. Authors such as [2] argue that, as artificial agents
will never be able to engage in genuine moral reflection, they will never be proper moral
agents —nor deserve any moral consideration as moral patients.
Regardless of that, we can already see examples of artificial agents acting in sce-
narios involving moral consequences, as pointed out by [1]. The way those events are
perceived and sometimes communicated to non-specialized audiences often relies on us-
ing concepts that are heavily intentional and loaded with moral connotations, such as
1Falmouth University, Cornwall (United Kingdom); joan.casasroma@falmouth.ac.uk
“attack”, or “save”. However, and considering that most experts agree on the fact that
AI systems cannot engage in genuine moral reflection, why are those terms used to talk
about such systems, then?
This position paper points towards how the use of a certain kind of terms in main-
stream media usually attribute intentions and moral values to AI systems that, more of-
ten than not, they do not have. Section 2 briefly shows examples of intentional attitudes
attributed; Section 3 discusses how those “morally-loaded” terms would be applied to
other entities such as inanimate objects, non-human animals or human beings; finally,
Section 4 points towards further directions of inquiry on this research line.
2. Intention, Fiction and Reality
The way AI systems have been depicted through the lens of fictional stories plays an
important part in this. As pointed out in [7], robots and AI systems in popular imagination
are generally seen with certain fear and anxiety. From anthropomorphic, resilient robots
that will not hesitate to harm a human being, such as The Terminator, to cold, goal-driven
AI systems looking to fulfill their mission objectives at all costs, such as HAL 9000 in
2001: Space’s Odyssey, fiction has given us lots of stories about rogue AIs going astray
and endangering human lives in the process.
Almost echoing those fictional stories, it is not uncommon to see newspapers’ ar-
ticles about malfunctioning AI systems that appeal to similar concepts as the ones we
can find in those fictions, such as an article from The Telegraph featuring the headline
“Robot vacuum cleaner ‘attacks’ South Korea housewife’s hair”2, or the Daily Mail’s
article with the headline “Rise of the Terminator-style robots that can decide when and
who to kill, warns expert”3, for instance. Similarly, one can also find articles in the oppo-
site direction of moral behavior, such as an article from Mirror with the headline “Robot
‘uses initiative’ to save little girl’s life”4.
Once one reads the articles, though, the first one points out to the fact that the house-
wife was sleeping on the floor, and so the robot accidentally started vacuuming her hair
and got stuck in it, whereas the latter explains that the robot’s action that resulted in
saving the girl’s life was pure coincidence, as the robot was simply mimicking the girl’s
movements, but with no awareness of neither the girl being in danger, nor of its actions
preventing her from being hurt. Nevertheless, both the terms “attacks” and “saves” con-
vey a sense of awareness and intention that, in neither case, the robots had. This kind
of concepts ascribes intentional behaviors and moral values that, more often than not,
only exist as a projection of our own human nature into systems that do not have them5,
and which may not, in many cases, be even able to recognize morally-relevant situations
—let alone act in accordance.
2https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/southkorea/11399713/Robot-vacuum-cleaner-attacks-
South-Korea-housewifes-hair.html
3https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1204072/Warning-Rise-Terminator-style-robots-decide-
kill.html
4https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/robot-uses-initiative-save-little-10746990
5In [4], the authors already argue how this anthropomorphization of technology could lead to an abrogation
of human responsibility.
3. Moral Attitudes and Intentions: Tools, Animals and Beyond
What happens when we use this kind of language to talk about AI-driven systems? Take
the vacuuming robot case, in which the headline of the article features the word “attacks”.
Although it is only fair to note that the word is written under quotes, one’s thoughts are
easily directed towards all those fictional stories of a robot uprising against humanity. Be-
cause, even if the word is (rightly) quoted in the headlines in order to give it a metaphor-
ical sense, it still embeds a notion of intentionality that, even if only in a fictional sense,
implies a will (or at least an awareness) of the robot to harm that person.
Suppose that we are writing a headline for an article saying that an unfortunate
pedestrian was walking under a construction site, when a hammer accidentally fell off
and hit that person. Would we say that the hammer “attacked” that pedestrian, even if
we quoted the relevant word? Suppose now that the hammer did not fall on its own, but
that a distracted construction worker accidentally pushed it with their foot and the ham-
mer fell off the scaffolding. Would we write that the worker “attacked” the unfortunate
pedestrian? Probably not, because we instantly recognize a lack of (at least) intention
and awareness in both cases; nonetheless, these lacks seem to be often overlooked when
the article is about AI systems like a vacuuming robot, even though, as pointed out by
[5], machines are often understood as being instruments —like a very complex hammer.
Conversely, if our unfortunate pedestrian was not hit by a brick, but rather bitten by
a dog, we would probably write a headline saying that a dog “attacked” that person (most
likely without any kind of quotation). If our unfortunate pedestrian was, instead, harmed
by another person, the headlines could change depending on the relevant situation. Say
that the pedestrian was attacked by a burglar: for sure, the newspaper headline would
feature the unquoted “attack”. Say now that the poor pedestrian gets kicked by a football
player who unwillingly hit the pedestrian while aiming for the ball: the headlines would
not probably feature the word “attacked” (either quoted or unquoted), and the nuance
with respect to the previous case lies in the “unwillingly” bit. In order to feel that the
word “attack” is being used in a legit way, we require the entity that is causing harm to
fulfill some conditions of agency, such as a certain form of autonomy, choice, or intention
—or at least some sort of awareness of that action harming the patient.
Although the previous paragraphs focus mainly on “negative” attributions, the same
dynamics can be seen when attributing “good actions” to AI as a result of some sort of
altruistic behaviors and features that robots may not have —namely, intrinsically caring
about human lives, anticipating dangers and acting on their own initiative to prevent
them. Even if some AI systems may be aimed towards that, such as robots in the field
of healthcare that are explicitly aware of the well-being of their human patients, it could
lead to the wrong impression that AI systems in general can (and should) do that, and
thus may result in people tending to rely on those systems for things they are not meant
to do, and which may not even be able to acknowledge.
This takes us right back to the question of AI and agency; because, if, by using
those terms, we can attribute intentions to AI systems, then where does this leave AI in
terms of its agency, and in relation to other entities, such as inanimate objects like tools,
or non-human animals? By having briefly considered how those terms would apply to
other kinds of entities, it can be seen how the terminology often used in communications
aimed towards the general public draws a picture of AI that distances it from the way it
is characterized by specialists in the field, and with respect to other kinds of entities like
tools, or other living beings. Even though people working in the field may be aware of
the actual state of affairs in AI, using this kind of terms in order to provide an appealing
“punch-line” for the news can convey the wrong message to non-specialized audiences
and draw a biased picture of what AI is, how it relates towards human beings, or whether
it is even aware of human values and our general well-being.
4. Conclusions and Future Work
In this position paper it is shown through some examples how some newspapers’ articles
aimed for the general public often use certain terms that ascribe intentions and moral
weight to AI systems and robots that challenge the status that machines have with respect
to other entities; in particular, it can be seen how the use of those concepts situate AI
in a fuzzy position oscillating between inanimate object, non-human animal, and often
even reaching beyond that. Furthermore, it is suggested how the use of those terms for
non-specialized audiences can have a detrimental effect on the integration of these tech-
nologies in our society by drawing the wrong picture of what AI actually is. This fact
can easily become a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it can be a way of making
certain AI systems, such as assistants, easier to relate to by projecting in them an intrinsic
care towards human life; on the other hand, it can easily attribute to those systems non-
existent intentions to either harm or help other human beings, which could make some
people reluctant to accept them, or create expectations they cannot yet fulfill.
Those intuitions are laid out in this position paper as pressing issues, but they would
need to be assessed by further research. Audience studies would need to be carried out
to confirm, or disprove, the picture of AI the audience perceives from the media. Ad-
ditionally, a comprehensive comparative between the way media aimed for the general
public ascribe intentional and moral attitudes to inanimate objects, non-human animals,
and human beings (the latter in cases of both intentional and accidental action) could
provide the measurement scale to see where AI systems fit in this continuum; this could
then be used to define some guidelines for journalists when writing about this topic. In
addition, a challenging, but interesting future research would involve understanding how
mistrust, or overconfidence in AI could hinder the effective integration of automated sys-
tems in our world, as well as foresee how those mislead perceptions could be exploited
with nefarious purposes by people or organizations wanting to take advantage from that.
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